Q2. Infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma. Consider the following game: Player 1 C Player 2 C 2,2 3,0 D 0, 3 1, 1 11 (a) Find do such that for &> So, there is an SPNE with both players play (C, C) under a grim trigger strategy. i.e., If someone deviates from the equilibrium strategy in time T, then in all tT+1, both player 1 and 2 plays (D,D) do should be chosen that 322 and 142 (b) Find do such that for &> So, there is an SPNE with (C, D) and (D, C) alternating each period under a grim trigger strategy. i.e., If someone deviates from the equilibrium strategy in time T, then in all t>T+1, both player 1 and 2 plays (D,D)
